yesterday evening while I was planning my roadtripping from Washington DC to Davis (CA), I found this interesting Google bug (?)

Well.... What button should I click to send the link to my friend ?
Security it's my main field, about security and about my life you'll find here.
The goal of this two-day workshop is to identify and agree upon a set of requirements for a common data format for voting systems. While there have been many calls for a common data format for voting systems, there is little consensus on the requirements for this format or what it is to accomplish. Possible goals for a common data format include interoperability of different equipment, auditability, transparency, publishing (communication with consumers of election data, such as media outlets), integration between polls and registration, transition to electronic record-keeping, or the ability just to "get the data out" by any means possible. Stakeholders include manufacturers, election officials, the EAC, consumers of election data, voters, organizations with existing data formats (including OASIS and the Voting Information Project), academics, and others with related work.

Damn Vulnerable Web App (DVWA) is a PHP/MySQL web application that is damn vulnerable. Its main goals are to be an aid for security professionals to test their skills and tools in a legal environment, help web developers better understand the processes of securing web applications and aid teachers/students to teach/learn web application security in a class room environment.
America’s spy agencies want to read your blog posts, keep track of your Twitter updates — even check out your book reviews on Amazon.
In-Q-Tel, the investment arm of the CIA and the wider intelligence community, is putting cash into Visible Technologies, a software firm that specializes in monitoring social media. It’s part of a larger movement within the spy services to get better at using ”open source intelligence” — information that’s publicly available, but often hidden in the flood of TV shows, newspaper articles, blog posts, online videos and radio reports generated every day.
Register locations:
1. HKLMSystemCurrentControlSetControlTerminal ServerWdsrdpwdStartupPrograms
2. HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWinlogonAppSetup
3. HKLMSoftwarePoliciesMicrosoftWindowsSystemScriptsStartup
4. HKCUSoftwarePoliciesMicrosoftWindowsSystemScriptsLogon
5. HKLMSoftwarePoliciesMicrosoftWindowsSystemScriptsLogon
6. HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWinlogonUserinit
7. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionPoliciesSystemShell
8. HKCUSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWinlogonShell
9. HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionPoliciesSystemShell
10. HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWinlogonShell
11. HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWinlogonTaskman
12. HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionTerminal ServerInstallSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunonce
13. HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionTerminal ServerInstallSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunonceEx
14. HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionTerminal ServerInstallSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun
15. HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun
16. HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunOnceEx
17. HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunOnce
18. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWindowsLoad
19. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWindowsRun
20. HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionPoliciesExplorerRun
21. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionPoliciesExplorerRun
22. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun
23. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunOnce
24. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunOnceSetup
25. HKCUSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionTerminal
ServerInstallSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunonce
26. HKCUSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionTerminal ServerInstallSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRunonceEx
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28. HKLMSOFTWAREClassesProtocolsFilter
29. HKLMSOFTWAREClassesProtocolsHandler
30. HKCUSOFTWAREMicrosoftInternet ExplorerDesktopComponents
31. HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftActive SetupInstalled Components
32. HKCUSOFTWAREMicrosoftActive SetupInstalled Components
33. HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerSharedTaskScheduler
34. HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionShellServiceObjectDelayLoad
35. HKCUSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionShellServiceObjectDelayLoad
36. HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerShellExecuteHooks
37. HKCUSoftwareClasses*ShellExContextMenuHandlers
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39. HKCUSoftwareClassesAllFileSystemObjectsShellExContextMenuHandlers
40. HKLMSoftwareClassesAllFileSystemObjectsShellExContextMenuHandlers
41. HKCUSoftwareClassesFolderShellExContextMenuHandlers
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43. HKCUSoftwareClassesDirectoryShellExContextMenuHandlers
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45. HKCUSoftwareClassesDirectoryBackgroundShellExContextMenuHandlers
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55. HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerBrowser Helper Objects
56. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftInternet ExplorerUrlSearchHooks
57. HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftInternet ExplorerToolbar
58. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftInternet ExplorerExplorer Bars
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60. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftInternet ExplorerExtensions
61. HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftInternet ExplorerExtensions
62. HKLMSystemCurrentControlSetServices
63. HKLMSystemCurrentControlSetServices
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67. HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionImage File Execution Options
68. HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftCommand ProcessorAutorun
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70. HKLMSOFTWAREClassesExefileShellOpenCommand(Default)
71. HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWindowsAppinit_Dlls
72. HKLMSystemCurrentControlSetControlSession ManagerKnownDlls
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74. HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWinlogonUIHost
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76. HKLMSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWinlogonGinaDLL
77. HKCUControl PanelDesktopScrnsave.exe
78. HKLMSystemCurrentControlSetControlBootVerificationProgramImagePath
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80. HKLMSYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlPrintMonitors
81. HKLMSYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlSecurityProvidersSecurityProviders
82. HKLMSYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlLsaAuthentication Packages
83. HKLMSYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlLsaNotification Packages
84. HKLMSYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlLsaSecurity Packages
85. HKLMSYSTEMCurrentControlSetControlNetworkProviderOrder
86. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindows NTCurrentVersionWindowsload
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101. HKLMSoftwareClassesCLSID{CLSID}Implemented Categories{00021493-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}
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103. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerFileExts.batApplication
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105. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerFileExts.comApplication
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107. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerFileExts.htaApplication
108. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerFileExts.pifApplication
109. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerFileExts.scrApplication
110. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerFileExts.batProgID
111. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerFileExts.cmdProgID
112. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerFileExts.comProgID
113. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerFileExts.exeProgID
114. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerFileExts.htaProgID
115. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerFileExts.pifProgID
116. HKCUSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionExplorerFileExts.scrProgID
117. HKLMSoftwareCLASSESbatfileshellopencommand @=""%1" %*"
118. HKLMSoftwareCLASSEScomfileshellopencommand @=""%1" %*"
119. HKLMSoftwareCLASSESexefileshellopencommand @=""%1" %*"
120. HKLMSoftwareCLASSEShtafileShellOpenCommand @=""%1" %*"
121. HKLMSoftwareCLASSESpiffileshellopencommand @=""%1" %*"
122. HKCRvbsfileshellopencommand
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128. HKCRscrfileshellopencommand
129. HKLMSoftwareMicrosoftActive SetupInstalled ComponentsKeyNameStubPath=C:PathToFileFilename.exe
1. %ALLUSERSPROFILE%Start MenuProgramsStartup
2. %USERPROFILE%Start MenuProgramsStartup
3. %windir%Tasks
4. %windir%System32Tasks - Windows Vista
5. %ALLUSERSPROFILE%MicrosoftWindowsStart MenuProgramsStartup
6. %USERPROFILE%AppDataRoamingMicrosoftWindowsStart MenuProgramsStartup
Let’s quickly recap the Evil Maid Attack. The scenario we consider is when somebody left an encrypted laptop e.g. in a hotel room. Let’s assume the laptop uses full disk encryption like e.g. this provided by TrueCrypt or PGP Whole Disk Encryption.
Many people believe, including some well known security experts, that it is advisable to fully power down your laptop when you use full disk encryption in order to prevent attacks via FireWire/PCMCIA or ”Coldboot” attacks.
So, let’s assume we have a reasonably paranoid user, that uses a full disk encryption on his or her laptop, and also powers it down every time they leave it alone in a hotel room, or somewhere else.
Now, this is where our Evil Maid stick comes into play. All the attacker needs to do is to sneak into the user’s hotel room and boot the laptop from the Evil Maid USB Stick. After some 1-2 minutes, the target laptop’s gets infected with Evil Maid Sniffer that will record the disk encryption passphrase when the user enters it next time. As any smart user might have guessed already, this part is ideally suited to be performed by hotel maids, or people pretending to be them.
So, after our victim gets back to the hotel room and powers up his or her laptop, the passphrase will be recorded and e.g. stored somewhere on the disk, or maybe transmitted over the network (not implemented in current version).
Now we can safely steal/confiscate the user’s laptop, as we know how to decrypt it. End of story.
This article describes a recent attack trend called ClickJacking, aiming at the exploitation of hyperlinks as the attack vehicle.
This article introduces the reader to the attack concept and to the possible ways to implement it, by means of some practical
example. Then it discuss the detectability of this attack.


UIST (ACM Symposium on User Interface Software and Technology) is the premier forum for innovations in the software and technology of human-computer interfaces. Sponsored by ACM's special interest groups on computer-human interaction (SIGCHI) and computer graphics (SIGGRAPH), UIST brings together researchers and practitioners from diverse areas that include traditional graphical & web user interfaces, tangible & ubiquitous computing, virtual & augmented reality, multimedia, new input & output devices, and CSCW. The intimate size, the single track, and comfortable surroundings make this symposium an ideal opportunity to exchange research results and implementation experiences.
The net result is that these smallest botnets efficiently evade detection and closure by staying below the security radar and relying upon botnet masters that have a good understanding of how the enterprise functions internally. As such, they’re probably the most damaging to the enterprise in the longterm.
Keep in mind that these are HOW TO GET BANNED. In other words, this is a “DO NOT” list if you don’t want your adsense account to be disabled .1. Ignore Adsense Program Policies & TOS2. Click on your own ads, specially those you are “genuinely interested” in. Ask people to click on your ads: your friends, your family members, your relatives, your visitors, or even your dogs or your cats. Use proxies to avoid detection.3. Participate in some form of click-ring. Click-rings are groups of people who gather with consensus to click each others’ ads. Most commonly used methods are Yahoo Groups, instant messenger, mail list, web forum, or specially written software.4. Buy, write, or use click-bot software. Click-bot software will go around your site and click on your ads. Most of the times, these click-bots are using proxies to avoid detection.5. Pay the Indian-clickers. These are the people whose main jobs are clicking on PPC advertisements and paid by the malicious publishers. Most of them are from developing countries like India or China.6. “Invest” with websites that promises to deliver “adsense clicks” for your site. Whatever methods they are using, most likely it falls under one of the aboves.7. Extra words to make your visitors to notice your ads. Write “Click here” or “Please support us” or “Visit our sponsors”. Anything other than Google-approved “sponsored links” or “advertisements”.8. Put in as many ads as possible in every page. Put more than three units of the normal ads block, more than one unit of ads links, or more than one referral buttons for each adsense, adwords, and firefox; all in one page.9. Use spyware to get traffics to your site. Spyware, adware, malware, or whatever it is called can force computer users to open your website everytime they start the computer. Or even better, use some kind of specially written software, toolbar, etc to display or click on your ads.10. Use pop-ups on your website. Everytime your user open a page, pop-up another one, ideally with the smiley or the IQ Test advertisements.11. Get as much un-targetted traffic as possible, for instance using the auto-surfing programmes to rotate the members around your site and other sites.12. Put the adsense code in non-content pages: registration forms, term and condition, login page.13. Have a competitor contextual ad on same page with adsense ads, for example Yahoo Publisher Network. Please note though that non-contextual ads, e.g. affiliate links or keyword-based ads are acceptable by google and won’t get you banned.14. Get more than one adsense account. Maybe one for your dog-site, one for your cat-site, one for the v1agra pills, one for mp3 download, etc.15. Put your adsense code in email the email, usenet, RSS, etc.16. Tell everyone what is your CTR, your page impressions, etc. Telling people about your total earning, unfortunately, is allowed.17. Put Google logo where you shouldn’t, and don’t put the logo where you should. In other word, ignore Google trademark.18.Modify Adsense code as you see fit. Modify the layout, color, URL, will be well. Just anything other than copy-and-paste the code from Google.19.And, this is important: if and when Google Adsense Team sends you email, ignore it.20.Put adsense codes in the banned contents

The researchers used a clever trick to achieve this. In the existing code, they searched for short code sequences that end in a RET instruction. The RET instructions retrieves an address from the stack and jumps to this address. Using an ingeniously crafted stack consisting of the addresses of suitable code snippets, the researchers can recreate almost arbitrary programs. They created the required stack with a conventional buffer overflow in the existing program code. The program's next RET instruction consequently triggers a series of RETs which eventually executes the code that manipulates the election result according to the attackers wishes. The researchers have called their ingenious exploit technique "Return-oriented Programming".